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5 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Report of Sighting Strategic
Missiles in Cuba

25X1



a. Every element of the Cuban's story has been checked against relevant documentation, photography, and analytic data.

b. The emigre himself has been brought to Washington [redacted] and interrogated at length. 25X1A



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2. Our conclusions at this point are:

a. That the emigre is telling the truth; that is, he is being truthful about what he believes he saw.

b. Because of the very short glimpse he had of the missiles and the adverse conditions under which he observed them, we can never be sure that he was in a position to have gauged accurately such matters as length, diameter, and relative sizes of the smaller and larger missiles. However, it should be noted that he has an "engineer's eye". The dimensions he supplied on the "land-to-air" missiles he says he saw in the cave, as well as on display in Cuba on another occasion, are compatible with those of the SA-2 sustainer with the booster removed.

c. There are anomalies in his story, some of them fairly serious. For example, we have searched all photography of the area taken since late 1961 and have been unable to locate in photography a cave storage area which would correspond precisely to the facility he says he visited. On the other hand, the photography shows an underground bunker serving as an entrance or ante-chamber to a larger installation. The Cuban indicated during the debriefings that this was probably the facility he visited.

d. We have no other hard evidence that strategic missile systems have been introduced to Cuba since 1962, nor that any were left behind following the crisis period. We do know from repeated photographic coverage of the whole island that two or four pad fixed field launch sites comparable to those employed in the Soviet Union are not to be found in Cuba.

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e. On the basis of the evidence now in hand we have re-examined our long held position, i.e., "We do not believe there are strategic missile systems in Cuba." Our conviction is now less strong than before, but we are obliged to stick with the essential thrust of our previous judgement, based as it is on five years of careful surveillance and analysis. We do feel very strongly, however, that the extraordinary quality of the emigre's report impels us to take extraordinary measures to seek confirmation or repudiation of it.

3. In light of the emigre's report it is recommended that the highest priority possible be assigned to the collection of additional information on the site in question. We have instructed all personnel to exploit any lead on this general subject. This applies to clandestine operations, emigre reporting, diplomatic reporting, photographic readouts, map studies, etc. In particular it is essential that the frequency of [] flights over Cuba 25X1A be increased. As already noted in paragraph 2, photography of the Santiago area has disclosed no prepared launching sites. However, the SS-3 and SS-4 missiles with their associated supporting mobile equipment could theoretically be assembled and set up on a cleared, level, hardened area, such as an aircraft landing field in a matter of hours.

4. Immediate Steps to be Taken. There would appear to be little to gain from further questioning of the emigre. His story has not changed in its essentials since first received several weeks ago. Officers in DIA are aware that we have been checking out the original report of the emigre. Further delay in revealing our findings to DIA and to State is not warranted, and could result in speculation leading to leaks. We believe the Director should call in General Carroll and Mr. Thomas Hughes and lay our findings before them. They could be asked at this

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point to quash speculation on the original report, if any, in their shops.

5. Next we recommend that steps be taken to inform the highest levels of the White House, State, and Defense. One purpose of such a meeting would be to work out a common statement that could be used in the event the emigre's observations become common knowledge. Consideration could also be given at such a meeting to the proper procedure for handling the problem before Congressional committees.


6. Finally, we feel that the Director's approach should be in low key. Much needs to be done before we can finally validate this report.

DESMOND FITZGERALD
Deputy Director for Plans

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

CARL E. DUCKETT
Deputy Director for Science & Technology

Attachments:





(TAB A)
(TAB B)
(TAB C)

(29 May 1967) w/map

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI w/o map
1 - DDP w/o map
1 - DDS&T w/o map
1 - DC/WH/DDP w/o map

1 - DDI w/o map
1 - C/WH/  w/o map
1 - D/OCI w/o map
1 - C/IAS w/o map



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*note dissemin statement
on pg 4.*